Ok, I don't want anyone yelling Goodwin's Law so let me word this very carefully. What I am doing here is comparing the Bush administration to the political and military actions of the German state in 1938 - 1941. This has nothing to do with what the Nazi party stood for or its repressive and genocidal policies - just it's approach to achieving it's conquests over other countries.
I'm reading The Fall of Fortress Europe right now and I would like to quote from it (Batsford edition 1981) pages 13-14:
The German Army of the Weimar Republic and of the Third Reich was the direct descendant of the German Army of the Empire, its leaders being arrogant, chauvinistic, anti-Semitic, particularly narrow-minded, and poorly read in the world - as opposed to German - history and in the realities of politics. This failure in the education of Germany's soldiers was shared by a very large section of the German public in the first three decades of the twentieth century; all of them, the politicians, the soldiers, and the men and women in the street provided the ready prepared ground that was to be the forcing-bed for Hitlerism.
Hitler himself had very much in common with the political and military leaders of the Hohenzollern Empire, because he was a product of his times and because he appears to have been an avid reader of the German political and military histories and treatises of the day. So Hitler and his military men were to display much of the strength and nearly all the weaknesses of the old Empire, showing that they had learned little from the errors of their predecessors as together they prepared to launch, and then Hitler alone led, eighty million people further along the very same path to political, national and existential suicide.
Probably the most important factor underlying the defeat of Germany in the First World War had been the inability of the Kaiser and his political and military leaders to understand the limits of Germany's war potential and, at the same time, appreciate the political, moral, and material strength of the enemy coalition that they had so wantonly provoked into the war against them. Nor could they realize the limitations of the use of armed force or the proper place of arms in the exercise of politics. Intoxicated by military pageantry, they let the armed force oust diplomacy so that they came to believe that foreign politics and the fate of nations could be decided only by the sword. And so political action came to be based on military thought, on the quicksands of the Great General Staff's appreciation, for all German general staff planning before 1914 had been based on the assumption that had been allowed to develop into an unquestionable premise - that no nation was capable of conducting a protracted war, and that German troops were superior to all others. Discounting world opinion and the certainty that Britain would come into the war. Berlin intended to crush the French in a lighting six week campaign before throwing its main forces eastward against Russia. In such a way did the German Empire enter the First Word War armed with a plan of campaign (Feldzugsplan) instead of a war plan (Kriegsplan).
...
...von Ludendorff and Hitler continued to underestimate not only the fighting men, but the political will, the stamina and the resilience, and the industrial and economic might of their adversaries. Nor did they attach much importance to the role of diplomacy, for Hitler, like the Kaiser and his imperial suite, of which von Ludendorff has once formed part, continued to rely on the military solution to Germany's problems, based on the cowing of opposition by the threat of arms or on the single lightning campaign, breathtaking in its effrontery in that it was undertaken with scant attention to the strength of the enemy or of his allies or to the long term and world-wide political and economic consequences. For Hitler, like the German generals and the general staff whose war planning ceased at the water's edge, lacked a sense of world geography. As it happened in 1914, so it happened again in 1939 and 1941 when Hitler launched Germany into the unknown with nothing but a six weeks' campaign plan in his pocket.
Now there is never the case where history repeats itself exactly. So there will always be differences. But with that said, the past 6 years under the Bush administration are incredibly similar to the Germany described above. Lets walk through this.
"they came to believe that foreign politics and the fate of nations could be decided only by the sword" - This is easily the single biggest strategic mistake Bush, Cheney, et-al made. That because we have the most powerful military by far, that there is no need for diplomacy and instead we can resolve issues by force.
"develop into an unquestionable premise - that no nation was capable of conducting a protracted war" - Go back to the discussions before the Iraq invasion when the whole thing would be over in weeks. That Iraq was not capable of fighting longer than that.
"that German troops were superior to all others" - It took the military over a year and the Bush administration several years to realize that they were actually losing in Iraq. Again, they entered Iraq knowing, not assuming, but knowing, that we would win quickly.
"was undertaken with scant attention to the strength of the enemy or of his allies or to the long term and world-wide political and economic consequences" - Again, this matches what we have seen the last several years in regard to the war on terror in general and the war in Iraq in particular. In fact, we did worse as we did not underestimate the opposition we would find in Iraq, we flat-out did not know it existed. And the world-wide political and economic consequences grow worse every month - this month its $100.00/barrel oil and Turkey set to invade Iraq.
when Hitler launched Germany into the unknown with nothing but a six weeks' campaign plan in his pocket - Did the Bush administration have even a 6 week plan when invading Iraq? They clearly had no plan for what to do once general combat operations completed. This is scarily similar.
For Hitler, like the German generals and the general staff whose war planning ceased at the water's edge, lacked a sense of world geography. - Now here you will say that the U.S. military has a global view. And it does. But the world has changed. The U.S. Military had (and has) a very good picture of the nations that are potential enemies. But for enemies that are not a state, for insurrections, for terrorist organizations, for countries in a state of anarchy, our military was woefully uneducated and unprepared.
For Germany it used to be enough to control the continent. With the 20th century control of the ocean mattered and Germany missed that. Now with the 21st century it's the stateless enemy that matters and we missed that. It's the same failure of strategic vision.
its leaders being arrogant, chauvinistic, anti-Semitic, particularly narrow-minded, and poorly read in the world - as opposed to German - history and in the realities of politics - Ok, we finally can point to an improvement, the Bush administration is not anti-Semitic. But the rest of this again is a charge that can be levied against the Bush administration. Their approach to the war on terror, especially Iraq, was and is unquestionably arrogant and chauvinistic (in the nation-based as opposed to the more common gender-based meaning of the word). And Bush especially is incredibly ignorant of the rest of the world. (Note: Bush may read a lot of books - but that does not mean he understands them)
von Ludendorff and Hitler continued to underestimate not only the fighting men, but the political will, the stamina and the resilience, and the industrial and economic might of their adversaries - Clearly the Bush administration and our military horribly underestimated the political will, stamina, and resilience of our enemy. We are still underestimating it as the number of soldiers killed is higher this year than any preceding year.
But even worse, we have not only underestimated the industrial and economic might of our adversaries, we are still underestimating it. Until the advent of the British Empire the strongest nation was the one with the most powerful armies in the field. Britain changed that equation and the strongest nation was the one with the most productive economic system and the ability to raise the most money. And in WWII America used those abilities to win the war.
Well it's changing again. In two ways. First, because we are pouring trillions into the middle east paying for oil, we are providing our enemies with the financial resources they need to fight us. As long as we continue to pay for both sides to fight, the war will continue.
Second, it's not manufacturing capability and financial reserves. With asymmetrical warfare, the advantage goes to the group that has no country, no physical location, no manufacturing base, no populace. We're a fixed target with a well defined infrastructure and command structure. The terrorists have none of that. In asymmetrical warfare they not only can hurt us, but it is much harder for us to hit them back.
And so...
What does all of this mean? Well, as Einstein said, "continuing to do the same thing and expecting a different result is a form of insanity." We're taking the same approach that Germany took on WWI and WWII and they failed both times.
Keep in mind I did not cherry pick above. Virtually every specific weakness and blind-spot listed above, the Bush administration has repeated. And for most of the items, is continuing down that same failed path. If we duplicate the failed approach of Germany in both world wars, why should we expect to succeed.
I have to admit that the similarities here worry me a lot. I re-read it looking for differences and couldn't find any of significance. And then I thought about how Germany was stopped when it tried to fight on three main axis in Russia and were stopped at the gates of Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad. We've been stopped in two small countries, Afghanistan and Iraq that would have been mere speed bumps for the German army.
We may be losing this war and just not realize it yet. And not just losing in terms of exiting Iraq and letting it fall into anarchy but losing in that when we find we are still in a major war. I hope not, but I'd sure like to hear some valid arguments about how we are not similar in our efforts to Germany in 1914 and 1939-41. Because that road leads to severe failure.
